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NOTES

L'Affaire des Foulards-Discrimination,
or the Price of a Secular Public
Education System?
Abstract
This Note examines the recent controversy over France's
ban against "ostentatious" religious symbols in public
schools. The only ostentatious symbol targeted by the French
government, however, has been the head scarves worn by
Muslim schoolgirls. The author explores the roots of the
current ban by examining France's traditionof assimilationof
immigrants and Its constitutionally mandated secular public
education system.
The author also compares France's
interests in prohibiting head scarves with the Muslim
students' interests in practicing their religion. Finally, the
author concludes that the French policy of banning head
scarves from school is not only impractical, but likely a
violation of both French and Internationallaw.
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I. INTRODUCTION

L'Affaire des Foulards refers to the national controversy in
France' over a ban against wearing the Muslim hyab2 in public
schools. 3 The controversy began in 1989 when the headmaster of
a junior high school in Creil, a suburb north of Paris, expelled
three Muslim girls for wearing Islamic scarves in school. 4 The
French government took notice when more schools followed suit,
1.
A similar debate has arisen in Canada. John Lejins, Muslim Females'
Head-Scarves Controverslal,OTrAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 17. 1994, at C6.
2.
Also called the hyab, meaning veil, the head scarves cover the hair.
forehead, and neck of Muslim females.
3.
James 0. Goldsborough, Girls' Scarves in France Cloak Immigration
Truths. SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.. Sept. 19, 1994, at B5.
4.
France and Islam: Veil of Tears, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1989, at 54, 54
[hereinafter Veil of Tears].
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but eventually backed away from an outright ban.5

However,

each case involving the Muslim scarf was handled on an
individual basis between the girl and the school, and many cases
were resolved by mutual compromise.
Once the Conservatives defeated the Socialists in the 1993
parliamentary elections, 6 Francois Bayrou, France's newly
appointed Education Minister, renewed the controversy by issuing
an order prohibiting "ostentatious" signs that "divide our youth"
in public schools. 7 In practice, the only "ostentatious" symbol
targeted has been the hyab; no one has been, or is likely to be,
8
suspended for wearing a Christian crucifix or Jewish yarmulke.
While former President Francois Mitterand, a Socialist, called for
a "threshold of tolerance," 9 France's new conservative President,
Jacques Chirac, wholeheartedly supports Bayrou. Apparently,
Chirac sees immigrants, especially Muslims, as a threat to the
"non-religious" character of French schools.' 0 Bayrou and his
supporters insist that the ban is necessary to promote France's
secular public school tradition" and the assimilation of students

5.
Education Minister Lionel Jospin told French television: "The fact that
a child arrives at school wearing a scarf is not a reason for expulsion." Id.
6.
Elections to the French National Assembly were held in two rounds on
March 21 and 28, 1993. The Socialist Party (Partisocialiste) suffered a terrible
defeat, its representation falling from 252 to 54. The conservative Gaullist Party
(Rassemblementpour la Rdpubltque (RPR)) emerged as the strongest party in the
Assembly with 247 representatives, almost doubling its pre-election strength of
only 126. Additionally, a right-wing party, the Union for French Democracy
(Unionpour la dgmocratlefrancase(UDF)). increased its representation from 131
to 213.
France, VII Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Oceana
Publications), France Supp.. Sept. 1994, at vii-viii (June 1988) [hereinafter
Constitutions of the World].
7.
France Human Rights Practices, 1994, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Mar. 1995,
available In LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter France Human Rights,
19941. The National Union of Secondary School Teachers expressed its dismay
that Bayrou did not consult with school personnel before announcing the ban.
The main union of school principals also questioned Bayrou's ban, saying its
members preferred to deal with the controversy on a case-by-case basis through
negotiation and compromise. Ban on Islamic Scarves Renews Debate, TENNESSEAN,
Sept. 15, 1994, at 3A [hereinafter Ban on Islamic Scarves].
8.
Adam Sage, Chador Wear Spurs Battle in France; Muslim Schoolgirls
Defy Ban on TraditionalIslamic Garment, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 1, 1994, at 48A.
9.
Scott Draft, National Agenda, France's Culture War Gets Cooking In
Classroom, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1995, World Report, at 3.
10.
Id.
11.
The French Constitution specifically guarantees the right to free and
secular public education: "The nation guarantees the equal access of children
and adults to instruction, to professional training, and to culture.
The
organization of free and secular public education at all levels is a duty of the
State."
FR. CONST. (1946) pmbl., para. 13.
For a discussion of French
constitutional law, see infra Part lIA.
For a historical overview of the
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of foreign origin. 12 Critics 13 respond that the ban violates
religious freedom;' 4 others claim its basis is racism.15 At the
same time, some women's groups' 6 welcome the ban because
they see the Islamic scarf as a symbol of the oppression and
confinement of women.' 7 Whether Islam mandates that females
wear the hyjab (as many fundamentalists insist),18 or merely
provides the option of doing so, is a subject of lively debate among
Muslim adherents and scholars. 19 Regardless of Islamic law, the
development of France's tradition of secularity, see generally RELIGION, SOCIETY
AND POLITICS IN FRANCE SINCE 1789 (Frank Tallett & Nicholas Atkin eds., 1991)
[hereinafter RELIGION, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN FRANCE]; PHYLLIS STOCK-MARTIN,
MORAL EDUCATION FOR A SECULAR SocIm: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALE LAIQUE IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY FRANCE (1988).
12.
See discussion nfra Part H.A.
13.
The Catholic archbishop of Paris immediately denounced the ban,
calling the schoolgirls innocent bystanders in a political fight. Moreover, he said
that the scarves "represent no more a threat to public order than Jewish
yarmulkes or Christian crucifixes." Veil of Ignorance, France Teaches a Lesson in
Narrow-Mindedness, ASIAWEEK, Nov. 23, 1994, at 24, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Veil of Ignorance].
14.
See Iranian Women Protest French Ban on Headscarves, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 31, 1994, availablein LEXIS, News Library, AFP file.

The French Constitution also provides for religious freedom:

"[France]

ensures equality before the law for all citizens, without distinction as to origin,
race, or religion. It respects all beliefs." FR. CONST. art. 2.
15.
"Decisions like this portray Islam once again as evil. .

.

. It also

deepens animosities and excites racist attitudes."
Angeline Oyog,
France-Women: Battle Against Islamic Extremists Shifts to School, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Sept. 15, 1994 (quoting Mouloud Aounit, Secretary-General of the AntiRacism Movement (MRAP)).
16.
"1 cannot but be satisfied. I have been opposed to the wearing of the
veil which in its symbolism, reduces women to sexual objects that must be
hidden." Id. (quoting Khelidja Bereczi of the International Solidarity Network with
Algerian Women).
17.
For an Arab feminist's thoughts on the hyJab. in which the hyab Is
described both as a symbol of oppression, and as an immediate remedy for
sexism in Arab society, see generally Lama Abu-Odeh, Post-ColonialFeminism and
the Veil: Considering the Differences, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1527 (1992). Abu-Odeh
herself has rejected the veil, but explains that it does have an "empowering and
seductive effect on Arab women." Id. at 1527. A debate on the pros and cons of
the hJab is beyond the scope of this Note.
18.
Fundamentalist Islamic countries such as Iran, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia force women to wear the veil. DemocraciesLift Veils of Ignorance, TORONTO
STAR, Oct. 16, 1994, at C2 [hereinafter Democracies Lift Veils]. For a tragic
example of the extreme lengths to which Muslim fundamentalists may go in
"enforcing" their views on the hyJab, see Youssef M. Ibrahim, Bareheaded,Women
Slain In Algeria, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at A3.
19.
See generally FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST
INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN ISLAM (Mary Jo Lakeland trans., 1991):
Abdullahi An-Na'im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim
Context, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 491 (1987) (arguing that women's rights, including the
right to choose or reject the hyJab, are Islamic notions, which have been subverted
in the interest of the male elite).
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issue in France2" centers on whether a Muslim girl may wear the
21
hijab as a matter of state law.
In September of 1994, when Bayrou first announced the ban,
approximately 2,000 girls challenged the prohibition and
continued to wear the hyjab to school.2 2 By January 1995, that
number had decreased, but approximately 37423 still defied the

ban. Schools were given until the end of the school year in June
to achieve total compliance. 24 By the end of the 1995 school year,
only 115 girls had been expelled for refusing to observe the
mandate. 25 The controversy thus appeared to have died down
and the tide had turned in favor of the Muslim girls. In one suit
contesting expulsion for wearing the hyjab, a court awarded a
Moroccan-born girl from Nancy, France, approximately $10,000.26
This Note attempts to explain the origins of L'Affaire des
Foulardsand focuses on the legality and practicality of the ban on
the Muslim hjab. Part II of this Note presents the historical and
contemporary background giving rise to the ban on the head
scarves, including a brief outline of traditional Islamic law, in
contrast to the law of the state. Part II also includes a discussion
of France's secular tradition and an explanation for the timing of
the new prohibition on the hyjab. Part III analyzes the legal
traditions of France and of public international law in relation to
the hijab ban. Part IV explains why the ban is not only contrary
to French law, but to public international law as well. This Note
concludes that from a pragmatic standpoint, the ban conflicts
with current French legal and social policy and is simply not
worth the tension that it has generated in French society.

20.
The same issue is a controversy in Canada.
21.
See discussion Infra Part I.
22.
Almost 400 Girls Defy French HeadscarfBan, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE,
Jan. 24, 1995, availableIn LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Around the World, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 1995, at 10A.
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II. BACKGROUND

27
A Islamic Law and the Hijab

A proper understanding of the nature of the hyab debate
requires, to some extent, a basic comprehension of the traditions
and tenets of Islamic law and Muslim peoples.
Islam

encompasses approximately 837 million 28 followers found across
the globe, who represent many diverse cultures, 2 9 economic
groups, languages, and political institutions.3 0
Islam, like
Christianity and other major religions, reaches throughout the
world.
At its most basic level, Islam entails following the path of God
or submission to shart'a,3 1 -the Arabic word describing Islamic
law.3 2 According to Islam, sharL'a originates from the word of the
Prophet Mohammed, the Qur'an,3 3 and the traditions of the faith.
Shari'a incorporates the social customs and institutions of the
diverse peoples who have converted to Islam.
Thus, the
development of shari'ahas been "a dynamic process of interaction
between Islamic principles and endogenous norms and
practices."3 4 As there is no "one people" of Islam, there is no "one
law" of Islam; sharl'a is not a uniform code of law, in part because
of the varying interpretations arising out of the diverse and
35
geographically divided Islamic world.
While shari'amay not provide a completely uniform system or
precise code of law, some fundamental principles exist that are
relevant to this discussion. Under shari'a, secularism does not
exist; thus the majority of Muslims cannot accept complete

27.
For the purposes of this Note, the discussion of Islamic law is limited
to the basic tenets necessary for understanding the analysis. For a good general
overview of the law of Islam, see JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW
(1964); N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964).
28.
MUSLIM PEOPLES, A WORLD ETHNOGRAPHIC SURVEY xxi (Richard V. Weeks
ed., 1984) [hereinafter MUSLIM PEOPLES]; see also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, ISLAM
OBSERVED: RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT INMOROCCO AND INDONESIA (1968).

29.

See generally MUSLIM PEOPLES, supra note 28, at xxi.

30.

See generally Shahnaz Khan, Canadian Muslim Women and Sharl'a

Law: A FeministResponse to "Ohl Canada!". 6 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 52 (1993).

31.
David A. Westbrook, Islamic InternationalLaw and Public International
Law: SeparateExpressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819, 823 (1993).
32.
An-Na'im, supra note 19, at 491.
33.
Analogous to the Christian Bible or Jewish Torah, the Qur'an is the
Arabic text of the literal and final word of God as revealed to the Prophet
Muhammad between 610 and 632 A.D. Id. at 491 n.1.
34.
Id. at 494.
35.
Khan, supra note 30, at 56-57.
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secularism. 3 6 Followers of Islam believe that they have a clear

and definite obligation to conduct every aspect of their public, as
well as their private lives, in accordance with the principles of
shari'a, as outlined in the Qur'an. 37

Furthermore, since shari'a

provides for a code of ethics and a positive legal system, it
regulates the full range of human activities in both the public and
private spheres, including religious rituals, social manners,
political institutions, personal relationships,38 as well as civil,
commercial, criminal, and family law matters.
While Islam would appear to directly contrast with any notion
of a secular society, the legal standards of many predominantly
Muslim countries seem to be based, at least in part, on secular
legal ideas. Many constitutions of Muslim countries specifically
provide that sharl'a is the source of law.3 9 In reality, however,
sharl'a may only survive intact in the area of personal affairs,
The rise of the Islamic
family law, and inheritance.
any
challenges
however,
movement, 40
fundamentalist
secularization of public life. 4 1 This rise in fundamentalism in the
international community evidences itself, in part, in the strict
Iranian and Saudi Arabian laws mandating the hjab or the
chador.4 2 Even in more moderate Islamic countries, family and
inheritance laws, which touch issues of larger concern in the
female population, are still governed strictly by shari'aand appear
Nevertheless, until this
to support the hyab tradition.4 3
resurgence of the Muslim fundamentalist movement, wearing the

36.
An-Na'im, supra note 19, at 492.
See, e.g., Qur'an 5:44-47, 24:51.
37.
An-Naim, supranote 19, at 494 n.12.
38.
39.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, XVI Constitutions of the Countries of the
World, Saudia Arabia, at 41 (May 1995).
40.
The fundamentalists blame Western influence for the secularization of
Muslim law. Programs for eliminating Western influence are embodied in the
treatises of influential fundamentalists such as IMAN KHOMEINI, ISLAM AND
REVOLUTION:

WRITINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF IMAM KHOMEINI 223-73 (Hamid Algar

trans., 1981).
41.
See generally VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM (John L. Esposito ed., 1983);
ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD (All E. Hiflal Dessouri ed., 1982).

For a

discussion of the causes of the Islamic resurgence, see Khurshid Ahmad, The
Nature of Islamic Resurgence, In VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM, supra, at 218, 21829.
Democracies Lft Veils, supra note 18, at C2. The chador refers to the
42.
covering of the entire body from head to wrist to floor in a loose-fitting, robe-type
garment.
43.
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015,

1028 (1991). The Canadian Society of Muslims recently proposed that consenting

Muslims be subjected to Muslim Personal Status Laws in Canada. One author
says that this attempt to attack racism in Canada simply feeds sexism within the
Muslim society. Khan, supra note 30, at 54; SCHACET. supra note 27, at 76.
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veil was4 5 for the most part a matter of choice" for Muslim
women.
This Note does not attempt to solve the religious debate over

the origins or necessity of the hyjab. This Note presumes that in
France, 4 6 Muslim schoolgirls wear the hljab because of individual
religious convictions, not outside pressures 4 7 or state mandates.
B. A Secular Tradition in France
For the past two centuries, the French have struggled with
the conflict between church and state. 48 Secularism, for many
French people, has represented a triumph for tolerance,

44.
According to Moncef Barbouch of the Canadian Muslim Forum,
wearing the h/Jab is a "divine obligation," however, women are free to chose to
disregard the obligation and should likewise be respected. Eve McBride, The
Hgab's Contradictions: A Form of Freedom Without Choice, GAZETTE (Montreal),
Oct. 6, 1994, at A2.
45.
Abu-Odeh, supra note 17, at 1527. For a historical and scholarly look
at the origins of the hJab from a Muslim feminist perspective, see MERNISSI, supra
note 19. at 85-180.
46.
The same applies in Canada. See Hyab Report Is Right on the Mark;
Schools Should Heed Advice and Stop Discrimination,GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 16,
1995, at B2 [hereinafter Hijab Report Is Right on the Mark].
47.
Of course family pressure can at times be just as coercive as a state
mandate. See Abu-Odeh, supra note 17. at 1529 (describing a "crime of honor"
where a brother kills his sister for her immodest public behavior and may be
imprisoned for only one year); see also McBride, supra note 44, at A2. On the
Canadian struggle over the hyab McBride states:
That's my problem with the whole hijab Issue: not that it symbolizes for
Muslim women freedom from physical (sexual) judgment and
objectification, not that it offers them dignity, security and uniform
egalitarianism, but that wearing it might not be a real choice for them. If it
isn't, then its presence contradicts its very purpose. It Is not a freedom at
all, but an imposition.
Id.
William Drozdiak, In Lyon, A Mosque of Reconciliation; Protested Building
Viewed as Symbol of Islam's Slow Assimilation Into French Culture, WASH. POST,
Mar. 5, 1995, atA31. "The head scarf is a sign of modesty and not aggression. I
think the kids should be allowed to follow their own consciences in this matter,"
states Abdelhamid Chirane, the Algerian-born grand mufti (cleric) of Lyon's
Muslim community. He has two daughters, each with a different view on the ban:
one insists on wearing the scarf, while the other does not wear the scarf. Id.
Compare the sentiments ofArezki Dahmani, the president of the pro-minority,
state-funded group France Plus: "[Elverywhere they tel me, 'you have to ban
these veils' otherwise they will be forced to wear them by their families." Sharon
Waxmnan, War of Nerves; France Walks a Tightrope Between Curbing Radical
Muslims and Abusing Rights; ParisStruggles to Strike Balance of Freedom, Security,
CHI. TRm., Feb. 3, 1995, at 1. See also discussion Infra Part IV.
48.
See generally RELIGION, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN FRANCE, supra note 11;
see also STOCK-MARTIN, supra note 11, at 2-5.
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universalism, and reason.4 9 Today, France is the only country in
Europe, and one of only five countries in the world, that legally
separates church and state.5 0 In fact, secularity is enshrined in
the French Constitution. 5 1 For Islamic immigrants, however, this

secular tradition is difficult, perhaps impossible, to understand or
adopt because Islam increasingly does not recognize the truly
secular society.5 2 Since Islamic law permeates every aspect of
Muslim life,5 3 France has experienced assimilation problems with

many of its Muslim immigrants.
While the Muslim immigrants have had trouble adapting to a
secular society, France has experienced difficulty in dealing with
the influx of a new minority culture. France's universalism,
rooted in its secular tradition, encourages the French to accept as
French anyone from anywhere, as long as the newcomer becomes
"French."5 4 For the typical Muslim immigrants, who differ from
the typical French citizens in almost every way-from language, to
race, to geographic backgrounds, to the more obvious religious
and cultural differences-becoming "French" is a daunting
prospect. Thus, a simple hjab, when worn by Muslim girls,
signifies to many French a refusal to become French. 5 5
C. TraditionalAssimilation-Becoming French

The assimilation of Muslim minorities is a new twist on an
old French problem. Centuries ago, France itself arose from the
amalgamation of Francs, Normans, Bretons, Basques, Germans,
Provencals, and other Europeans. 5 6 Ever since, French policy
has encouraged, perhaps coerced, new immigrants to assimilate

49.
French Enlightenment?. BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 1994, at 20; Secularlty
Defied, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 1994, at 53, 53.
50.
The other four are: Turkey, India, Mexico, and Japan. Matthew
Fraser, Religious Revlval, Secular Values In Many Nations Are Facing Growing
Challenges. GAZETTE (Montreal), Jan. 16, 1994, at BI.

51.
See FR. CONST. (1946) pmbl., para. 13; see also id.art. 2 ("France is a
Republic, indivisible, secular, democratic and social.... .")(emphasis added).
52.
See supra Part lI.A.
53.
Id.
54.
French Enlightenment?,supra note 49, at 20.
55.
Id.; see also Democracies LIft Veils, supra note 18, at C2. France is not
the first country to view the hyab as irreconcilable with a truly secular society.
Both the Turkish despot, Kamal Ataturk, in the 1920s, and the pro-Nazi Reza
Khan, the first Shah of Iran, in the 1930s, banned the hf/ab in what the Toronto
Star labelled "anti-religious zealotry in the name of secularism." Id.
56.
This is not to say that the assimilation of France's other minorities
occurred hassle-free.
See JAMES E. JACOB, HILLS OF CONFLICT:
BASQUE
NATIONALISM IN FRANCE (1994).
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by adopting French traditions, laws, and language. 5 7 Thus,
anything that emphasizes cultural or religious differences, such
as the Muslim hyjab, is seen as opposition to the French model for

integration and cultural homogeneity.5 8

France's focus on

complete assnilation obviously leaves no room for a
multiculturalist philosophy, such as that of the United States or
Canada.59
France has also rejected the other extreme represented by the
German and English separatist concept, by which immigrants are
kept apart from the domestic population. While accepting their
presence, the native community never lets the immigrants forget
their origins.6 0 Jean-Claude Barreau, the former head of the
French Office of International Immigration and now advisor to
Charles Pasqua, Minister of the Interior, explained France's
unique policy on inmigration as follows:
"When someone
immigrates, he does not simply change country, he also changes
history.... Foreigners arriving in France must understand that
henceforth their ancestors are the Gauls. They have a new
fatherland."6 1
Because the new Muslim immigrants, unlike their earlier
European counterparts, 62 may differ racially, culturally,
linguistically, and religiously from the French population,
complete assimilation is even more problematic.
Perhaps
recognizing the unique difficulty of absorbing the Muslim
population, the French government created the Council for the
Reflection of Islam in 1990 to help integrate Muslims into French
society.6 3 Additionally, some parts of France have adopted a new
ten-week, state-sponsored course in le gout, or "taste," in an effort
to use a cultural force for the assimilation of (Muslim) minorities
many of whom are Muslim.64 By exposing school children to

57.
FranceHuman Rights Practices, 1993, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Feb. 1994,
available In LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File [hereinafter France Human Rights,
1993].
58.
Id.
59.

"MC[multiculturalism] would be the end of France....

You can be

what you want to be here-Christian, Jewish, Muslim-but we're all Gauls," says
Pierre Lellouche, government deputy from a suburb of Paris. French Bar MC,
Want Own Culture Taught, PR SERVICES, Jan. 1994, at 15, available In LEXIS.
News Library, Arcnws File.
60.
Goldsborough, supranote 3. at B5.
61.
Secularity Defied, supra note 49, at 53.
62.
Mostly, French Muslim immigrants hail from former French colonies
and territories, such as Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and black Africa. Waxman,
supra note 47, at 1; Don MacPherson, Quebec Cannot Copy Solutionsfrom France,
CALGARY HERALD, Feb. 17, 1995, at A5; see also MUSLIM PEOPLES, supra note 28, at
Md.

63.

FranceHuman Rights, 1993, supra note 57.

64.

Draft, supra note 9, at 3.
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traditional French foods, such as Brie and quiche Lorraine, the
government hopes to encourage minorities to become truly
65
"French."
C. The CurrentPoliticalAtmosphere in France
At least one commentator has suggested that the end of the
Cold War leaves Islam to serve as the new "enemy" of Western
democracies.6 6
Predominantly practiced in Third World
countries, Islam differs vastly from traditional Western religions.
Also, Muslim fundamentalists have wreaked havoc on Western
67
security with terrorist attacks and declarations of Jihad.
However, France, as the European country with the largest
Muslim population,6 8 cannot afford to make Islam its enemy;
France must learn to live in peace with its new citizens.
1.

Rising Fundamentalism in France's Muslim Population
Various estimates put France's Muslim population at three,

four, 69 or even five7 0 million people out of a total French
population of fifty-six million. Even using the most conservative
estimate, France has the largest Muslim population in Europe. 7 1
In fact, in January of 1995, the French government officially
recognized Islam as the country's second largest religion, behind
Catholicism. 7 2 Nonetheless, Islam does not lend itself to easy
assimilation.
In fact, ghettoization of Muslim immigrants in public housing
projects is increasing,7 3 and unemployment among Muslim
immigrants remains high. 74 Some Muslim commentators opine
that religion acts as a "stabilizing force," easing some of the
discontent among this politically disadvantaged group of
immigrants. 75
Others feel that Muslim anger over France's
involvement in the Gulf War-against the Islamic fundamentalist
country of Iraq-may have helped the fundamentalists gain a

65.

Id.

66.
"Islam is substituted for communism or fascism as the ideology of the
barbarians." Westbrook, supra note 31, at 821.
67.
Jlhad means holy war.
68.
See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
69.
Waxman, supra note 47, at 1; Veil ofIgnorance,supra note 13, at 24.
70.
MacPherson, supra note 62, at A5.
71.
Waxman, supra note 47, at 1.
72.
Drozdiak, supra note 47, at A31.
73.
Waxman, supra note 47, at 1.
74.
Secularity Defied, supra note 49, at 53.
75.
Waxman, supra note 47, at 1.
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"foothold" in what was once a rather "unassertive" community. 7 6
The French government, however inaccurately, perceived a rise in
the number of radical Muslim fundamentalists, and reacted
against the Muslim community as a whole. One result of this
volatile situation was the ban on the Islamic hjab in public
schools.
2. Civil War in the Former French Colony of Algeria
The ban on the hyJab may also stem from the tension in both
the immigrant and native French communities over the civil war
in Algeria. France views the Islamic militant movement in Algeria
as a serious threat to its own national security.7 7 Its fears are in
no way unfounded, as evidenced in a recent hijacking attempt by
radicals who planned to blow up a plane and its passengers over
Paris. 78 Additionally, the radical fundamentalists have found
supporters closer to home. Authorities recently arrested four
Muslim French men for gunning down two Spanish tourists in
Morocco.
The four men had been recruited and trained by
79
militants in France.
On the Algerian front, fundamental Muslim revolutionaries
have killed at least four thousand people since 1992. Of those
killed, the revolutionaries have targeted women associated with
secular causes who were seen bare-headed in public.8 0 While the
hyjab symbolizes religious devotion to the Muslims, it may connote
sympathy with the cause of dangerous militant Algerian
8
fundamentalists to the French.
The war in predominately Muslim Algeria bolstered the
xenophobia of the French people. 82 Muslim extremism in Algeria
translated into an unreasoned 83 fear of Muslim extremism at
home in France. 84 Consequently, the ban on the hyjab resulted

76.
Secularlty Defied, supra note 49, at 53.
77.
The December 1994 hijack crisis in Marseilles ended in a shoot-out
between French commandos and the Algerian hijackers. Chris Hedges,' The
World. Breaking with the U.S.; France Wages a Lonely Battle with Radical Islam,
N.Y. TmiEs, Jan. 1, 1995, § 4, at 5.
78.
Id.
79.
Waxman,supranote 47, at 1.
80.
Ibrahim, supra note 18, at A3.
81.
MacPherson. supra note 62, at A5.
82.
Veil ofIgnorance,supra note 13, at 24.
83.
The fear may be unreasoned, but as exhibited by the terrorist attacks,

it Is not completely unfounded.
84.
Veil of Ignorance, supra note 13, at 24. Conservative politicians, such
as Jean-Marie Le Pen, the ultranationalist leader of the National Front, played on
the xenophobia of French citizens in the last election with favorable results.
William Drozdiak, TV Debate Boosts Chirac in French President's Race, WASH.
POST, May 4, 1995, at A32.
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from a fear of Muslim immigrants due to their perceived
connection to Islamic fundamentalism and the bloody civil war
raging in Algeria.
The prohibition on the hyab may seem reasonable at first

glance (or at least reasonable from a reactionary standpoint), in
view of France's traditions of secularity and assimilation, and its
current dilemma with its immigrant Muslim population.
However, at the very least, the ban may present problems from
both a practical and a legal standpoint.
III. FRENCH LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

5
A. ConstitutionalLaw of France0

Individual rights are guaranteed in the Preamble to the
French Constitution 8 and are rooted in the following: the body of
the Constitution of 1958,87 the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and of the Citizen of 1789,88 the Preamble to the 1946
Constitution of the Fourth Republic,8 9 and the "fundamental
principles recognized by the laws of the Republic." 90
Article II of the Constitution of 1958 states: "France . . .
ensure[s] the equality of all citizens before the law, without
distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs."9 1
Paragraph 11 of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution
guarantees the "equal access of the child and the adult to
education, professional training and culture. The establishment

85.

For an overview of French constitutional law, see generally JOHN BELL,

FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1992); Denis Tallon. The Constitution and the Courts
In France,27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 567 (1979); Nicolas Marie Kublicki. An Overview of
the French Legal System from an American Perspective. 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 57

(1994).
86.
Constitutions of the World, supranote 6. at 21.
Id., at 21-51. France has had five constitutions since the 1789
87.
revolution, each corresponding with the formation of a new Republic (Republique).
The first was in effect from 1789-1804; the second, 1848-1852; the third, 18701940; the fourth, 1944-1958; and the present Constitution came into effect in
1958.
88.
Declarationof the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of August, 26, 1789,
Fr. Law: Const. & Selective Leg. (Transnat'l Juris. Publications) 2-3 (Dec. 1994).
89.
Preamble of the Constitution of October 27, 1946, Fr. Law: Const. &
Selective Leg. (Transnat'l Juris. Publications) 2-6 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter
Preambleof the Constitution].
90.
BELL, supra note 85, at 57. Bell has described this final tenet as the
"in case we haven't forgotten anything" principle. Id. at 68.
91.
Constitutions of the World, supra note 6, at 22.
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of free, secular, public education on all levels is a duty of the
State." 9 2 Thus, the present Constitution provides for both secular
education and freedom of religion.
According to Education
Minister Bayrou, the Muslim schoolgirls' practice of wearing the

hljab (which Bayrou apparently does not recognize as the practice
of religion under the Constitution) conflicts with the guaranteed
right of secular public education. 9 3
B. InternationalLaw

1. The U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief9 4
The U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (the
Declaration) was adopted in 1981. 9 5 The Declaration is "regarded
throughout the world [and most certainly in France] as
articulating the fundamental rights of freedom of religion and
belief."98
Similar to the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the Declaration guarantees both freedom to practice
one's religion or belief,9 7 and freedom from discrimination based
98
on religion or belief.
Article 1 of the Declaration provides:
1.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a
religion or whatever belief of his [or her] choice, and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or private,
to manifest his [or her] religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice or teaching.
2.
No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair
his [or her freedom to have a religion or belief of his [or her] choice.
3.
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be

subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedom of others. 99

Thus, a state may not limit a person's freedom of thought or
the freedom to have a religious belief, but it may limit the freedom

92.
Preambleof the Constitution of October 27, 1946, supra note 89, at 2-6.
93.
See Ban on Islamic Scarves, supra note 7. at 3A.
94.
G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess.,.73d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 51,
at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981) [hereinafter Declaration].
95.
Id.
96.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/44/Add.2. at 1 (statement by the United
States Government); see also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26, at 48-49.
97.
See infra note 102 and acconipanying text.
98.
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
99.
Declaration,supra note 94, art. 1.
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to manifest one's religion or belief (the crucial issue in the hyab
I0 0
debate) in order to protect other important state interests.
Article 1(3) provides the state with some authority to limit

religious expression,' 0 ' as long as the proscription is necessary
for the protection of "public safety, order, health, morals, or the
Apparently,
fundamental rights and freedoms of others." 10 2
Bayrou believes that it is necessary to limit- Muslim girls'
individual rights to wear the hjab in order to protect the state's

interest in secular education.

The Muslims argue that a

balancing of interests should weigh more heavily in favor of
individual rights.
This sort of conflict is similar to U.S. experiences. First
Amendment jurisprudence in the United States provides a few

examples of cases in which the state's interest in health and
public safety outweigh the individual's interest in practicing his or
her religion. 0 3a Many of these cases have involved Jehovah's
Witnesses and their right to refuse blood transfusions and
medical treatment for their children and themselves,' 0045 or their
right to bring children into the public streets to preach.'
Article 2 of the Declaration provides for the right to be free
from discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief:
1.
No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State,
institution, group of persons, or person on grounds of religion or
other beliefs.
For the purposes of the present Declaration, the
2.
expression, "intolerance and discrimination based on religion or
belief" means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or effect

100.

See generally Alexandra C. Kiss, Permtssible Limitations on Rights, in

THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:

THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

290 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
101. Declaration,supra note 94.
102. Id. But see Church of Lukumi Bablalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993) (holding governmental interests did not outweigh plaintiffs' rights
to practice religion through the ritual slaughter of animals); Doe v. Irwin, 428 F.
Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (holding that the state failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest in the distribution of contraceptives to minors sufficient to
overcome the parents' right to free exercise of religion in the education of their
children).
103. See Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 1595 (1990) (upholding state's right to prohibit drug use.
even as to ceremonial ingestion of peyote).

104.

See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F. Supp. 488

(W.D. Wash. 1967) (state may intervene in parents' religiously motivated decision
to refuse blood transfusions for children), affid 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam).
105. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (finding that the
state interest in the safety of children outweighs the parental right to teach and
train in certain religious practices).
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nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal
basis.106

The Declaration refers not just to discrimination, but to
"intolerance" as well. 1 0 7 At least one commentator has concluded
that intolerance implies not only a "particular type of violation of
religious freedom or of discrimination, but rather includes the
attitudes that may motivate such violations."10 8 It follows then,
that since the xenophobic attitudes of the French people and
government
may
have
considerably
influenced
the
implementation of France's ban on the Muslim hjab in public
schools, the ban may contravene the basic principles of the

Declaration.
Article 2(2) also permits the inference of purpose from effect.
Thus, specifically proving intent is unnecessary-one need only
show the discriminatory effect of the practice at issue to invoke
the protections of Article 2(2).
In this way, Article 2(2)'s
protection is more expansive, thereby expanding its protection.1" 9
Because religious
discrimination
may be
ingrained
in
socioeconomic and cultural institutions, 1 10 protection against
acts having a discriminatory effect in addition to those with a
discriminatory purpose is considered by some to be essential to
eliminating certain forms of discrimination. 1 1 Therefore, when
"ostentatious" symbols are banned from public schools, but the
only individuals affected by the ban are Muslims and the only
symbol affected by the ban is the hjab, there arguably is a
violation of the Declaration on the basis of those discriminatory
effects, even in the absence of a clear discriminatory purpose.
Finally, Article 5 of the Declaration provides that children
retain similar rights against religious discrimination and that
parents have "the right to organize the life within the family in
accordance with their religion or belief and bearing in mind the
moral education in which they believe the child should be brought
up."" 2 Thus, according to the Declaration, Muslim parents in
France have the affirmative right to raise their daughters in the
Islamic tradition, which may include wearing the hjab while in

106. Declaration,supra note 94,art. 2.
107. Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through
the UN Declarationon the Eliminationof Religious Intoleranceand Discrimination,82
AM. J. INT'L L. 487, 504 (1988).

108.
109.

Id. at 505.

THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAw-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS:
CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND PRocEss 11-16 (1986).

110. See Infra note 127 and accompanying text.
111. On the nexus between other forms of
discrimination on the basis of religion, see Infra part IV.
112. Declaration,supra note 94. art. 5(1).

discrimination

A

and
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school. In addition, the Declaration also purports to protect a
Muslim girrs individual right to express her religion by wearing
the hjab.
2. Customary International Law
Whether the Declaration itself constitutes customary
international law is unclear.1 1 3 However, since an international
consensus on the human right to be free from religious
discrimination can be found in the U.N. Charter, 1 14 the
Declaration,"15 and even domestic constitutions,1 6 a general
prohibition against religious discrimination would likely qualify as
a tenet of customary international law.
Section 702 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, however, states that the U.N. Charter "links
and places religious discrimination on the same plane with racial
discrimination and to the extent that racial discrimination
7
violates the Charter, religious discrimination does too.""1
Additionally, Sullivan opines that, "as the Declaration acquired
concrete material content through its implementation, it will
contribute to the acceptance of the customary law status of [the
prohibition of religious discrimination]."" 8
Certainly, a state-wide ban on one form of religious symbol,
to the exclusion of all others, in public schools constitutes a state
policy furthering religious discrimination.
Assuming that

systemic religious discrimination as a matter of state policy does
violate customary international
law, 119 it should be condemned by
120
the international community.

113. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also Sullivan, supra
note 107, at 488.
114. The United Nations was created in part to promote and encourage
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions
as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3) (emphasis added).
116. See discussion supra Part Ill.B.1.
116. Specffically, the French Constitution guarantees freedom of religion.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
702 cmt. j (1987); see also Sullivan, supra note 107, at 488-89 n.7.
118. Sullivan, supra note 107, at 489-89.
119. See Id. at 488-89, n.7 (discussing whether a relevant norm exists as
customary law).
120. A discussion on the problems and processes involved in the
enforcement of international human rights is beyond the scope of this Note. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

Introductory Note to Part VII (1987) ("Special international 'machinery has been
created to monitor compliance with international human rights law, but the
effectiveness of those bodies and procedures in helping induce compliance has
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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Why the Ban Violates the Tenets of the French Constitution
In his book, Bell describes the "notorious battleground" in
France over freedom of education. 1 2 1 The current battle is
between the Conservatives, who favor private religious education,
and the Socialists and Communists, who oppose state funding for
private religious schools. 12 2 The hyjab debate arises out of this
controversial battleground. The Conservatives point to the hijab
as an affront to secular public education. At the same time, they
are unwilling to commit public funds to private Islamic schools as
they have done with Catholic schools.
The Socialists and
Communists are unwilling to commit public funds to any private
schools, but believe that the hijab should be a matter of
individual, not state, choice.
The real question, then, is not whether a woman has the
right to wear the hijab as a practice of her religion-undoubtedly,
under the French Constitution, she does. The true issue is
whether wearing symbols of religious faith in schools violates the

guarantee of secular public education also embodied in the
Constitution. Since symbols of Christianity or Judaism have not
been similarly targeted, and according to Bayrou and his
supporters, do not seem to violate the same constitutional
guarantee, the hijab should not violate the Constitution either
simply
because
Bayrou
has
arbitrarily
labelled
it
"ostentatious." 123
In its choice to selectively regulate against Islam and not
Christianity or Judaism, the French government has brought the
fight over Islamic fundamentalism into the schools. 12 4
For
France, this is really a political matter, not a constitutional Issue.
Unfortunately, Bayrou and his supporters, in using one part of
the Constitution to discriminate against Muslim girls, have
conveniently ignored another constitutional guarantee, that of

been variable."). See also Procedurefor Dealing with Communications Relating to
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 27, 1970, ECOSOC
Res. 1503 (XLVIII), 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. IA) 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1
(1970); Hurst Hannum, Implementing Human Rights: An Overview of Strategies
and Procedures, In GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS PRAcTICE 19 (Hurst
Hannum ed., 1992).
121.
BELL, supra note 85, at 151.
122.
In fact, in 1904 the French government banned religious orders from
teaching at all in France. Id. While the Constitution guarantees secular public
education. France readily offers public funding for private Catholic schools.
123.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
124.
See Hedges, supra note 77, at 5; Waxman, supra note 47, at 1.
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freedom of religion. Taken as a whole, the French Constitution
supports the girls' rights to express their religious freedom by
wearing the hjab in school.
1 25
B. Why the Ban Violates InternationalLaw

Religion and ethnicity are often "inextricably enmeshed in the
political, cultural and socioeconomic life of the community."12 6 In
France, the Muslim schoolgirls' Islamic beliefs are evidenced by
their manner of dress. They are readily distinguishable from the
rest of the population, 127 just as Jews who keep kosher would be
distinguished by their dietary practices. 128 Like race, the visible
12 9
characteristics of religion may facilitate discrimination.
Additionally, all too often the boundary between religion and

politics blurs and perceived political exigencies may facilitate
religious discrimination.' 3 0 As Sullivan explains in her article,

"all too frequently a state seeking to suppress religious freedoms
characterizes the activities of religious groups and leaders as
impermissible political action or subversion."' 3 1
Sullivan
continues by explaining that while
governments [like France] do have a legitimate interest in
controlling violence against the state or disruption of public order,.
. . violations of religious freedoms and the persecution of religious
leaders and groups under the pretense of restraining impermissible
political activity are far more prevalent than is the use of a religious
identity to camouflage actions motivated by purely partisan
1 32
political concerns.

Thus, where the state activity is merely a pretext for religious
discrimination, relying on false political concerns and targeting an
easily identifiable group, that activity should not be tolerated by

the international community.

125.
For a discussion on whether the United Nations discriminatorily holds
First World countries to a higher standard in the protection of human rights than
it does the Third World, see Thomas M. Franck, Of Gnats and Camels: Is There a
Double Standard at the United Nations?,78 AM. J. INT'L L. 811 (1984).
126.
Sullivan, supra note 107, at 508.
127.
Otherwise, there would be no need for the ban in the first place.
128.
See Sullivan, supra note 107, at 508.
129. Id.
130.
France recently expelled a Muslim cleric (who, not surprisingly,
opposed the ban on the hgab) to Casablanca for speaking out against Muslim
integration and for having views that were deemed "incompatible with a state of
law." Muslim Cleric Expelled as "Threat"to France, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994,

at A15.

131.

Sullivan, supra note 107, at 499.

132.

Id.
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As this Note discusses previously, under the Declaration, an
individual has the right to manifest religious beliefs in worship,
observance, practice, or teaching, 13 3 subject only to legitimate

state interests in safety, health, morals, or other fundamental
rights of others.1 3 4 Thus, the Declaration clearly provides that
Muslim schoolgirls should be allowed to express their religion by
wearing the hyjab, unless France can show a competing and
overriding interest. Furthermore, the Declaration states that one
cannot be discriminated against through any exclusion or
1 35
distinction based on religion or the manifestation thereof.
Hence, France's singling out of the hyab in its ban on
ostentatious symbols also seems to violate the terms of the
Declaration.
Sullivan has suggested a framework for settling conflicts

arising between the rights enunciated in the Declaration and
other human rights or state interests. This approach identifies
the significant interests of both sides and balances those rights
13 6
and interests.
Before attempting to quantify an individual's right to religious
expression and in order to properly balance that interest, one
must consider some basic human rights concerns that stem from
religious law. Religious law may incorporate elements hostile to
various human rights, infringing upon those rights by differing
degrees. As one commentator has suggested, dress codes for
women are among the least intrusive, in contrast with such
extreme violations of human rights, such as the freedom from
torture and the right to life, by practices such as mutilation and
37
the suttee.

Some manifestations of religion or belief are "so obviously
contrary to morality, public order, or the general welfare that
public authorities are always entitled to limit them or even to
prohibit them altogether." 3 8 These include human sacrifice, selfimmolation, mutilation of oneself or others, or slavery, all of
which may be restricted without constituting discrimination per

133.
134.
135.
136.
this type
(S.D.N.Y.

Declaration,supra note 94, art. 1.
Id. art. 1(3).
Id. art. 2(2).
Sullivan, supra note 107, at 510. U.S. law comports somewhat with
of balancing. See Bollenbach v. Bd. of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450
1987) (holding that the school district's refusal to assign women bus

drivers to routes serving Hasidic male students, as an accommodation to the
Hasidic belief in strict separation of the sexes, violates both the First Amendment

and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
137. Sullivan, supra note 107, at 514. Suttee refers to the practice whereby
a widow immolates herself on the funeral pyre of her husband.
138.
ARcOT KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRAcTIcEs 29 (1960).

IN THE MATTER OF
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se. l3 9 France has dealt with one such practice, the African
through criminal
tradition of female "circumcision,"1 40
prosecution. 14 1 Even these types of restrictions can be grounded
in the rights and freedoms of others (freedom from genital
mutilation, for example) and balanced according to Sullivan's
model. 14 2 Applying the above balancing test to the situation in
France involves not only identifying the significance of the hjab to
the adherents of the Islamic faith, but also the importance of the
state interest in prohibiting the hyjab in school.
In balancing the interests in LAffaire des Foulards, various
factors must be taken into account. 143 On the one hand are
France's secular school tradition, its interest in the assimilation of
immigrants, and its interest in equality of the sexes. On the other
hand, are the interests of the schoolgirls in following and
expressing their religious beliefs and the interests of the girls'
parents in raising their children according to the teachings of
their religion.
France does have legitimate concerns about the true aims of
the Muslim fundamentalists. 144 Nevertheless, on balance, the
prohibition of a simple scarf wrapped around a Muslim
schoolgirl's head will not prevent a major hijacking or
assassination. 145 Furthermore, France's proffered explanation for

139. Id.
140. For discussions of the cultural clash and human rights debate over the
predominantly African tradition of female "circumcision." see Note, What's Culture
Got to Do with It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female Circumcision, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1944 (1993); Robyn Cerny Smith, Note, Female Circumcision:
Bringing Women's Perspectives into the International Debate, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
2449 (1992).
141. See Rone Tempest, Ancient Traditions vs. the Law; Prosecutionof Two
Immigrantsfor "FemaleCircumcision"in France Highlight an Increasingly Common
Cultural Clash; Customs in One Part of the World Are Viewed as Repulsive in
Another, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1993, at Al.
142. Sullivan, supra note 107. at 511.
143. The debate over the propriety of the Muslim hyab is not limited to
France or Canada. For a legal perspective in the United States, including a
similar balancing of interests, see EEOC Decision No. 71-2620 (1971), 4 FEP
Cases (BNA) 23, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, LRRFEP File (holding that the
black Muslim faith Is religion and that discharge for wearing a long skirt was
unlawful bias). ContraUnited States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882 (3d. Cir. 1990)
(holding that it would have imposed an "undue hardship" on the school board to
require it to accommodate a Muslim public school teacher by allowing her to
teach in her religious clothes).
144. See supra Parts II and III.
145. Compare the viewpoint of Arezki Dahmani, who argues that "lylou can
say that four scarves won't destabilize France. but every time we look into it. we
find there are Islamic organizations behind each case." Waxman, supra note 47,
at 1.
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the ban, the divisive nature of the hyjab itself, is unparalleled by
the divisive nature of the ban. France's other explanation, the
tradition of secular education, also fails in the face of years of
tolerance of yarmulkes and crucifixes.
Finally, as this Note
discusses below, the ban cannot be explained by a public policy
that aims to eliminate discrimination against women.
C. Why the Ban is a Bad Ideafrom Both Policy and Pragmatic
Standpoints
In France, where society and the law mandate equality
between the sexes, the hijab should not be banned-especially not
by using the rationale that it is a symbol of oppression of women.
Prohibiting a woman's right to choose to wear the hiab may be
just as oppressive. In its report urging schools to be tolerant of
Muslim girls wearing the hijab, the Quebec Human Rights
Committee acknowledged the hijab as a sign of sexual inequality
in some countries, but said that in Quebec, "one should presume
that hijab-wearers are expressing their religious convictions and
the hijab should only be banned when it is demonstrated-and
not just presumed-that public order or sexual equality is in
danger." 46
Similarly, in France, where the Constitution
guarantees sexual equality,' 47 choosing to wear the hijab should
be just that-a choice.
Additionally, the ban causes tension by creating (or at least
spotlighting) a division in French society where none previously
existed. In fact, LAffaire des Foulards has sparked a furious
national fervor; riot police have had to break up demonstrations
in several schools.' 48 Sending Muslim schoolgirls home only
emphasizes the division in French society between the Muslims
49
and the French community at large.3
By singling out the Muslim scarves for banishment, and
ignoring the other innocuous symbols that students wear to
school every day, the French government has evidenced its true
intent to discriminate against Muslims because they are Muslims
(and not Christians or Jews). Bruno Megret, deputy leader of the
far right National Front, was quoted as saying that there was no

146. HJab Report Is Right on the Mark, supra note 46, at B2.
147. "The law shall guarantee to women, in all spheres, equal rights to
men." FR. CONST. (1946) pmbl., para. 3.
148. Secularlty Defied, supra note 49, at 53.
149. "In sending us home from school [the government] Is only going to feed
fundamentalism.... We understand there is fear, we know it very well. But we
say, let's try to calm things down, not by scapegoating Islam... but by dialogue."
Waxman, supra note 47, at 1 (quoting Sonja Merazga, a veil-wearing student
expelled from school in November of 1994).
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need to treat Islam equitably with "traditional European religions
150
[because] it is incompatible with our civilization and our laws.'
The French Constitution, however, provides for freedom from
religious persecution and does not limit religion to Western or
5
traditional European faiths.' '
Furthermore, if public education must truly be secular, the

ban must be reconciled with the Constitution and common sense,
by either extending it to yarmulkes, crucifixes, and the like, or
On a political level, conservative
eliminating it altogether.
politicians may have bitten off more than they can chew by basing
their objections to the hyab on the principle of secular education.
For instance, some Muslim groups are demanding that the school
calendar be changed because it violates the hallowed principle of
15 2
secularity by recognizing Christian holidays.
On a practical level, if the French government disagrees with
establishing true secularity in public schools, and insists on
upholding the ban on ostentatious symbols only against Muslims,
Islam, as the second largest religion in France, should be entitled
to state funding for Muslim private schools-the same as
Catholics receive for their private schools.15 3 With Muslim private
schools, the Muslim girls could attend school without pressure to
abandon their religious practices, albeit separately from the rest
of French society and contrary to the stated French goals of
assimilation. 154
The common sense solution is to rescind the ban on the
scarves. 1 55 In this way, the divisive nature of L'Affalre des
Foulards will be put to rest, so that France and its Muslim
community can work together for reconciliation. "French Islam
can be a force for moderation and integration. " 1 56 Currently, the
enforcement of the h!Iab ban threatens such peaceful coexistence.

V.

CONCLUSION

From one perspective, the hJab debate is a controversy over
whether an "ostentatious" religious scarf should be banned in
France's secular public schools while other symbols are not-a

150.

Ban on Islamic Scarves, supranote 7,at 3A.

151.

See supra Part III.A.

152.
Secularity Defied, supra note 49, at 53.
153.
See Id.
154. See discussion supra Part II.C.
155. See Draft, supra note 9 (illustrating the problems that result from a
lack of communication).
156. Drozdiak, supra note 47, at A31.
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simple case of religious discrimination. On the other hand, the
hyab is not merely a form of religious expression, it also
symbolizes the division in French society along many lines
besides religious and secular, including cultural, political, and
racial.
Though the French may see the hjab as a symbol of the
oppression of women-a belief that some Muslims also share-the
schoolgirls and their families maintain that it is an important
symbol of religious faith and feminine reaffirmation.

And while

the French interpret the hyJab as a refusal to integrate and
consider it disruptive of the secular classroom, the hyab-wearers
insist upon its religious significance, not unlike a crucifix or
yarmulke. The ban on Muslim head scarves in France's public
schools is simply a bad idea.
Although the whole issue can be skirted superficially by
labeling it a mere fashion debate, moving the discourse back to
the rights of schools to enforce dress codes,1 5 7 the issue is
properly one for scrutiny under both French and international
law. The ban contrasts with France's traditions of liberty and
equality. By choosing a seemingly innocuous, yet symbolically
powerful issue in an attempt to force Muslims in France into
"Frenchness," the government has created an even greater rift in
French society. The ban also seems to violate the French
Constitution, though the Consell Constltutionnel5 s has never
ruled on that question. Additionally, the ban violates the tenets
of the United Nations, of which France is a member. The U.N.
Charter, and more specifically, the U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of Religion Intolerance and Discrimination, provides
for religious freedom. While France may not accept the assertion
that international law is controlling, at the very least, these
157.
"In the land of Hermes, it hardly seems possible that a schoolgirl's
shawl could become a matter of state." Veil of Tears, supra note 4, at 54.

The ban is all the more ridiculous since prominent French and other
Western fashion designers often produce dresses with scarves and other
types of headgear and Western women are often seen sporting these
scarves. If a head scarf is a threat to the Western philosophy, then it is
not philosophy, it's a Joke.
Western Paranoia.MONEYCLIPS, Sept. 14, 1994, available In LEXIS, News Library,
Moclip File.
158.
The Conseil Constitutlonnel can be compared with the United States
Supreme Court. However, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Conseil may not
create policy. It passes on the constitutionality of French laws, but is limited to
reviewing only the procedural and jurisdictional propriety of the law. Kublicki,
supra note 88, at 80. As of 1971, however, the Conseil does have the power to
protect individual freedoms under the Constitution.
See generally, Cynthia
Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties In France, The Conseil
ConstituttonnelSince 1971, 63 TUL. L. REv. 265 (1988).
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documents present persuasive evidence of an international norm,

purportedly supported by France as a U.N. member, against this
type of religious discrimination.

In this case, no interest of the

French government or other human rights initiatives supports
such an infringement of these girls' freedom to worship.
Cynthia DeBula Baines*

*

The author would like to give special thanks to her parents, James and

Susan DeBula, and to her husband, Troy Baines, for all their support.

